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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JURISDICTION OF MUNICIPAL ZONING QUESTIONS
The appellant secured a building permit for a nonconforming use.
Appellees, adjacent property owners, applied directly to the court and
secured an injunction' to enjoin the building of the nonconforming
structure. The appellants contended the court erred in granting the
injunction since the appellees had not exhausted their administrative
remedies before resorting to the court.2 Held: judgment affirmed. The
appellees were not "persons aggrieved"3 within the meaning of the
statute who could appeal to the Board of Appeals.4 They therefore had
no administrative remedies to exhaust and might properly apply for
injunctive relief.5 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Downing, 68 N.E. (2d) 789
(Ind. 1946).
1. The court found the appellees would suffer "special damages" if
the construction were not enjoined. In the following cases in-
junction was granted adjacent property owners on a showing of
"special damages." Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., 106 Conn.
475, 183 Atl. 483 (1927); Cohen v. Rosedale Realty Co., 120 N.Y.
Misc. 416, 199. N.Y. Supp. 4; (Sup. Ct. 1923), Pritz v. Messer, 112
Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 20 (1925); De Blasiis v. Bartel, 143 Pa. Super.
485, 18 A. (2d) 478 (1941).
2. Where .successive administrative appeals are provided by statute,
one is not ordinarily entitled to judicial relief until the prescribed
administrative remedies have been exhausted. Myers v. Bethlehem
Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211
U.S. 210 (1908); Red River Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 98 F.(2d)
282 (App. D.C. 1938); Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17
Cal. (2d) 280, 109 P. (2d) 942 (1942); Bassett, "Zoning" (1936) 160.
3. The common council of any city is empowered by statute to create
a board of zoning appeals to authorize variances and to hear and
determine appeals from any order, requirement, decision, or de-
termination made by an administrative official or board charged
with the enforcement of the zoning ordinance. Ind. Stat. Ann.(Burns, 1933) § 48-2304. The court's interpretation in the main
case is not compelled by this enabling act. The statute is silent
as to who may appeal to the board. The phrase "persons ag-
grieved" appears only in the portion of the statute providing cer-
tiorari from the board to the court.
4. A& more liberal interpretation including adjacent property owners
was adopted in the following cases: Michigan-Lake Bldg. Corp. v.
Hamilton, 340 111. 284, 171 N.E. 710 (1930); Standard Oil Co. v.
Commr. of Public Safety, 274 Mass. 155, 174 N.E. 213 (1931);
Breese v. Hutchins, 11 N.J. Misc. 74, 165 Atl. 94 (1933); Junge's
Appeal, 89 Pa. 543, 548 (1926). Adjacent property owners in
New York City may take appeals to the Board of Standards and
Appeals. McGoldrick, Grauband and Horowitz, "Building Regula-
tion in New York City" (1944) 258. The necessity of interpreta-
tion most commonly arises when adjacent property owners volun-
tarily seek administrative appeals and their right to dol so is ques-
tioned by the permit seeker. The main case poses but does not
answer this question.
5. § 28 of the Indianapolis zoning ordinance provides that buildings
erected in violation of the ordinance are nuisances and may be
abated by injunction.
(185)
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The effect of the decision is to create a divided authority in the
determination of municipal zoning questions. Although elimination of
the present divided authority appears desirable,6 it is clear that the
court does not believe that adjacent property owners have sufficient
notice of the issuance of building permits. The court is therefore re-
luctant to hold them "persons aggrieved" and so compel them to seek
administrative redress.7 While a provision for more adequate notice8
would remedy this objection, the present statutory provisions for in-
junctionO would remain a bar to effective administrative procedure.' 0
The elimination of the right to injunctive relief" as well as the in-
clusion of adjacent property owners within the phrase "persons ag-
grieved" appears necessary to secure finality in the administrative pro-
cedure.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LEGISLATIVE ABOLITION OF REMEDIES
sued for malicious alienation of the effections of his wife. Action
dismissed: statute' made the filing of such actions unlawful. Held:
6. The establishment of an area of exclusive jurisdiction of the Board
of Appeals would not only secure a uniformity of administrative
action and purpose, but would also remove a burden from the
courts to the extent that administrative appeals were successful
in removing causes of grievance.
7. Administrative redress must be sought within 30 days from the
date of the Building Commissioner's determination. Rules of Pro-
cedure of Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Indianapolis,
Art. I, f 6.
8. If constructive notice by publication is not sufficient, actual notice
might be secured by requiring applicants for building permits to
send a form notice to adjacent property owners within an area
of notice fixed by the Building Commissioner. McGoldrick, Grau-
band and Horowitz, "Building in New York City" (1944) 258.
9. Common councils pursuant to statute may declare that buildings
erected in violation of the zoning ordinance are common nuisances
and may be abated by injuction. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§ 48-2306. See n. 5 supra.
10. Judicial review by certiorari from the board to the court is pro-
vided by statute. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 48-2305. This
provision which expressly prohibits trial de novo on certiorari,
would become a dead letter if adjacent property owners, having
been adversely ruled against by the board, could secure a trial
de novo by applying to the court for injunction.
11. The elimination of injunctive relief would not prejudice the rights
of adjacent property owners since the statute provides that on
appeal to the board all work on the premises concerned shall be
stayed. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 48-2304. Also, the stat-
ute providing certriorari to the court from the board allows the
court on application to stay all work until final determination of
the cases is made. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 48-2305.
1. Ill. Laws 1935, p. 716, §1: "It shall be unlawful for any person
. . . to file (or) threaten to file . . . any pleading . . . seek-
ing to recover upon any civil cause of action based upon aliena-
tion of affections, criminal conversation, or breach of contract
to marry . . . "
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